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Abstract 
 This paper uses quarterly data from the social security registry 
covering the full population of Belgian firms to analyze how the secular 
decline in the firm entry rate affects aggregate employment. To this end, 
we disentangle the entry margin into two channels: the overall 
employment of new firms (the start-up employment) and the share of 
start-up employment by sector (the sectoral composition of start-ups). 
We find that the decline in start-up employment slowed down the growth 
rate of aggregate employment by 26 percent over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 
period by shifting the age distribution of firms towards older firms. The 
sectoral composition of start-ups accelerated the decline in the 
manufacturing sector and prevented the distribution sector from a 
potential decline, while leaving the aggregate employment unchanged.      
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1. Introduction 
In recent years entry of new firms and the prevalence of high growth firms has been 
declining. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda (2016) document declining business 
dynamism in the United States and suggest that it is driven by the increased product and labor 
market regulations. However, this pattern is not just seen in the U.S.. Bijnens & Konings (2018) 
document similar trends for Belgium, a small open economy with highly regulated labor 
markets, and suggest that global trends are at the basis of this decline.3 Akcigit & Ates (2019) 
explain the declining business dynamism in the US by the declining intensity of knowledge 
diffusion from the frontier firms to the laggard ones.  
The creation and destruction of jobs and firms facilitate the reallocation of resources 
from inefficient to efficient use, and hence promote aggregate growth. Therefore, this decline 
in business dynamism has raised concerns about its impact on productivity growth and overall 
macroeconomic performance (Alon, Berger, Dent, & Pugsley, 2018; Decker et al., 2017, 2018). 
Particularly striking has been the slowdown in firm entry during the last couple of decades. 
While there has been a lot of work emphasizing the role of firm entry for innovation and the 
process of creative destruction in general (Acemoglu & Cao, 2015; Aghion, Akcigit, & Howitt, 
2014; Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, & Prantl, 2009), little is known about how much the 
decline in firm entry matters for aggregate employment. In this paper we address this question 
using quarterly data from the social security registry covering the full population of Belgian 
firms for the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period. To this end, we disentangle the entry margin into two 
channels along which it affects the aggregate employment, the overall employment of new firms 
at the entry stage, or the start-up employment, and the share of start-up employment by sector, 
or the sectoral composition of start-ups. 
                                                          
3 Calvino, Flavio and Criscuolo (2019) document declining business dynamism for major OECD economies and 
highlight that it is more pronounced in digital intensive sectors. 
The first channel, the start-up employment, affects the aggregate employment directly, 
by creating jobs today, and indirectly, by creating jobs later on during the life-cycle of the firm. 
While estimating the direct effect is trivial, estimating the indirect effect requires taking into 
account the heterogeneity in the post-entry growth dynamics of firms. Recent literature 
highlights the importance of young firms for aggregate job creation (Criscuolo, Gal, & Menon, 
2017; Geurts & Van Biesebroeck, 2016; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013). In particular, 
young firms have higher employment growth rates and lower survival rates than their mature 
counterparts. Therefore, capturing this heterogeneity in the post-entry growth dynamics along 
the firm age dimension is relevant for estimating the indirect effect of the start-up employment 
on the aggregate employment.  
The second channel, the sectoral composition of start-ups, affects the aggregate 
employment by reallocating employment across sectors. While the direct effect of this on 
aggregate employment is negligible, the indirect effect requires taking into account the 
differences in the post-entry growth dynamics of firms across sectors. Foster, Haltiwanger, & 
Krizan (2006) show that the retail trade sector of the US in the 1990s was very different from 
the manufacturing or services, because of the intensive adoption of advanced information 
technology. They suggest that practically all of the labor productivity growth in the retail trade 
sector is accounted for by more productive entering establishments replacing less productive 
exiting establishments. Therefore, taking into account the differences in the post-entry growth 
dynamics of firms across sectors is relevant for estimating the indirect effect of the sectoral 
composition of start-ups on the aggregate employment. 
Our contribution to the literature is three fold. First, we quantify the impact of the 
declining start-up employment on the aggregate employment of a small open economy, 
Belgium. We find that the declining startup employment slowed down the growth rate of 
aggregate employment by 26 percent or 19 thousand lost jobs over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 
period. This is equivalent to 1.1 percent of the aggregate employment in 2009Q2. The lost jobs 
are mainly due to fewer young firms creating less jobs. For the US, Pugsley & Şahin (2019) 
show that the declining start-up employment decreased the aggregate employment by 11.4 
percent over the period of 20 years by shifting the age distribution of firms towards older firms. 
Not surprisingly, the impact of declining start-up employment on aggregate employment is 
much smaller in Belgium than in the US, since the employment share of start-ups in the US is 
much higher than in Belgium.   
Second, we disentangle the roles of the overall start-up employment and the sectoral 
composition of start-ups for aggregate employment. For Belgium, we find that while the 
declining start-up employment had a significant impact on the aggregate employment, it had no 
impact on the sectoral composition of the economy. On the other hand, the sectoral composition 
of start-ups decreased the employment of manufacturing by 7 percent and increased the 
employment of distribution by 4 percent over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period, while leaving the 
aggregate employment unchanged. The rise of employment in services is mainly driven by the 
post-entry growth dynamics of incumbent firms. In contrast, in the US the sectoral composition 
of start-ups is the main driver of the rise of services. (Dent, Karahan, Pugsley, & Şahin, 2016).      
Third, we build on the framework of Pugsley & Şahin (2019) and extend it to capture 
the heterogeneity in firms across sectors. In particular, we decompose the evolution of 
aggregate employment into the parts that age distribution and sectoral composition of firms 
account for. Holding sectors’ age-specific survival and conditional growth rates at their 
averages, this framework predicts well the path of aggregate employment over time through the 
endogenous shifts in the age distribution. Therefore, this quantitative model allows us to 
perform a counterfactual analysis, where we simulate different values of start-up employment 
and its allocation across sectors, and quantify the potential employment gains and losses. While 
this approach does not take into account the general equilibrium effects of the declining start-
up employment, the existing literature suggests that such feedback effects are insignificant. For 
the U.S., Sedláček (2019) shows that the response of incumbent firms is too weak to offset the 
overall effect of the declining start-up employment. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
methodology used; Section 3 presents the details of the data; Section 4 discusses the results; 
and Section 5 provides the concluding remarks. 
  
2. Methodology 
In this section we present an approach to estimate the impact of declining start-up 
employment on aggregate employment. Intuitively, the declining start-up employment affects 
aggregate employment directly, by creating less jobs today, and indirectly, by creating less jobs 
later on during the life-cycle. While estimating the direct effect is trivial, estimating the indirect 
effect requires taking into account the post-entry growth dynamics of firms and their 
heterogeneity. We focus on the heterogeneity in the post-entry growth dynamics along the firm 
age and sector dimensions. Our choice of firm age is motivated by the literature on firm 
dynamics, where young firms experience higher employment growth rates and lower survival 
rates than their mature counterparts (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). We differentiate between 
different sectors, because firms face different competition, regulation and technology levels in 
different sectors. For example, the retail trade sector of the US in the 1990s was very different 
from the manufacturing or services, because of the intensive adoption of advanced information 
technology (Foster et al., 2006). 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the intuition of how the entry margin affects aggregate 
employment. We focus on the manufacturing, services and distribution sectors. Each sector is 
grouped by the employment of entering firms (start-ups) and continuing firms (incumbents) 
based on firm age. Within incumbents we differentiate between the employment of young (5 
years old or less) and mature (6 years old or above) firms. The sum of employment among all 
age groups and sectors is the aggregate employment. The sum of employment among all start-
ups is the start-up employment. The share of start-up employment by sector is the sectoral 
composition of start-ups.  
The dashed lines show the direction of employment flows between age groups within a 
sector over time. The employment within a sector-age cohort depends on the employment of 
the same cohort in the previous period, its survival rate and conditional employment growth 
rate. When holding sectors’ age-specific survival and conditional growth rates at their averages, 
the variation in the aggregate employment comes from the variation in the current and past 
levels of both, the start-up employment and the sectoral composition of start-ups. 
 
Figure 1. The diagram illustrates how the start-up employment and the sectoral composition of start-ups affect aggregate 
employment. Even though not shown, the manufacturing and services can be further decomposed similar to the distribution 
sector. The dashed lines show natural transitions of firms between the age groups due to aging. In this framework firms can 
either grow older or exit over time. 
 Formally, we build on the framework of Pugsley & Şahin (2019) and extend it to capture 
the heterogeneity in firms across sectors. The dynamics of aggregate employment 𝐸 over time 
𝑡 can be written as the sum of total employment in each sector 𝑗 of the economy. The aggregate 
employment of sector 𝑗 can be split into the employment over age cohorts 𝑎. Hence, 𝐸𝑡 is given 
by  
 










,  (1) 
where 𝑆𝑡 is the sum of employment among firms of age zero (𝑎 = 0) at time 𝑡, or the start-up 
employment, 𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 is the share of start-up employment in sector 𝑗 at time 𝑡, or the sectoral 
composition of start-ups, and 𝐸𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 is the employment of age cohort 𝑎 in sector 𝑗 at time 𝑡. The 












 is the survival rate of firms in sector 𝑗 in age cohort 𝑎 over the period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, 
𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 is the conditional growth rate of average employment size of age cohort 𝑎 over the period 
𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, and 𝐸𝑡−1,𝑎−1
𝑗
 is the aggregate employment of the same cohort at time 𝑡 − 1.  The 
product of a sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates is the unconditional 
employment growth rate of the sector’s age-specific employment.     
 The start-up employment 𝑆𝑡 and the sectoral composition of start-ups 𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 provide the two 
channels of how start-ups affect aggregate employment. To isolate them, we replace the sector’s 









). Pugsley & Şahin (2019) show that using the sample averages of age-specific survival and 
conditional growth rates predicts well the evolution of trend of the aggregate employment in 
the US during the 1980-2010 period. This suggests that the fluctuations of 𝑥𝑡,𝑎 and 𝑛𝑡,𝑎 in the 





in Belgium were stable around their mean values and that using the sample averages predicts 
well the evolution of trend of the aggregate employment in Belgium. Therefore, the predicted 
evolution of aggregate employment can be written as  
 
?̂?𝑡 = ∑ (𝑠𝑡
𝑗



















𝑡=1 /𝑇.      
 To simplify Equation 3 we make use of the result in Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016), 
where authors show for Belgium that within age cohorts firm growth is strictly increasing with 
size until the age of five years, and afterwards it becomes independent of size. Therefore, we 
modify Equation 3 to distinguish between the firms up to the age of five years, and afterwards 
we group the firms that are six years old or above under the “6+” age group.  Taking into 
account this grouping, the predicted aggregate employment can be written as  
 
?̂?𝑡 = ∑ (𝑠𝑡
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𝑡=1 /𝑇. Later in the article, we are going to use 
this framework to simulate the counterfactual evolutions of aggregate employment as the result 
of varying the start-up employment 𝑆𝑡 or the sectoral composition of start-ups 𝑠𝑡
𝑗






In this section we describe the data used for our analysis. We use quarterly data from 
the National Social Security Office (NSSO) of Belgium on all firms paying social security 
contributions during the period from 2003Q1 to 2017Q1. The data does not include self-
employed people, because individual entrepreneurs report to the social security body for the 
self-employed, INASTI. However, it does include the people who work for self-employed. 
According to the estimate of the National Bank of Belgium, in the first quarter of 2017 there 
were 3.9 million domestic employees in Belgium, and according to the data there were 3.5 
million employees. Therefore, this administrative database covers around 90 percent of all paid 
employment in Belgium.4 
The data include both, actual and full-time equivalent (FTE) number of employees per 
firm per quarter. We use FTE number of employees as a proxy for firm size, because it captures 
the actual creation and destruction of jobs by firms. The measure also avoids double counting 
of part-time employees, who work for multiple firms. For the analysis, we focus on the 
manufacturing, distribution, and services sectors. These three broad sectors jointly represent 63 
percent of total employment. Therefore, going forward, the aggregate employment refers to the 
total employment of these three sectors. The employment share by sector is relative to this 
aggregate employment, meaning that the three sectoral employment shares sum up to one.  
 Manufacturing Services Distribution 
NACE 2-digit code (Rev. 2) 10 – 33 57 – 82 45 – 56 
Number of firms 20 475 52 225 95 770 
Average firm size 22.3 10.9 6.8 
Survival rate  0.983 0.979 0.974 
Conditional growth rate 1.01 1.023 1.025 
Table 1. The table reports summary statistics of NSSO data by sector for 2003Q1 – 2017Q1 period. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data by sector.   On average, the manufacturing sector 
had the lowest number of firms and conditional growth rate, and the highest average firm size 
                                                          
4 According to the estimate of the National Bank of Belgium, employees registered with the NSSO account for 
85 percent of all paid employment in Belgium. 
and survival rate. The distribution sector had the highest number of firms and conditional 
growth rate, and the lowest average firm size and survival rate.5   
To estimate the dynamic framework we measure the evolution of the start-up 
employment, the sectoral composition of start-ups, and the sectors’ age-specific survival rate 
and conditional growth rate over time. Since the data do not provide information on firm age 
explicitly, we infer firm entry based on the first appearance of a firm in the data set. Similarly, 
we infer firm exit based on the last appearance of a firm in the data set.6 We are also interested 
in measuring the employment of a “true” entry rather than the employment of a “spurious” 
entry, such as ID change of a firm, breakup of a firm into two or more firms, merger of two 
existing firms or acquisition of one firm by another. Geurts (2016) and Geurts & Van 
Biesebroeck (2016) show that such biases result in significant distortions of the size distribution 
of entering firms and of the estimates of the post-entry growth dynamics of firms. Therefore, 
we use the shares of “spurious” entrants by size (Table 2 in Geurts, 2016) as probabilities to 
correct the age distribution of firms by probabilistically re-assigning the age of entering firms 
to 𝑎 = 6+ based on their size. 
 
3.1.  Measuring the declining start-up employment 
To measure the start-up employment 𝑆𝑡, we sum up the employment of all firms with 
𝑎 = 0 at time 𝑡. Figure 2 plots the evolution of the start-up employment and the employment 
share of start-ups over time. The solid line shows that the start-up employment has declined 
from 3.8 thousand jobs in 2003 to 2.6 thousand jobs in 2014. After that the start-up employment 
began to rise reaching 3.2 thousand jobs in 2017. The employment share of start-ups followed 
                                                          
5 The time span of the data includes the revision of the NACE codes in the first quarter of 2008. While the re-
classification of the sectors during the 2007Q4-2008Q1 transition may cause some distortions, for the purposes 
of this article it is not significant because we focus on the period after 2008. 
6 There are firms that disappear from the data and reappear after some time. After a discussion with the NSSO 
representative, we conclude that these instances correspond to firms with zero employment, and do not 
constitute firm exit. 
similar path during this period. This trend is consistent with the evidence on declining business 
dynamism in Belgium (Bijnens & Konings, 2018).  
 
Figure 2. The figure plots the evolution of the start-up employment (the solid line) and the employment share of start-ups 
(the dashed line) over time in Belgium based on NSSO data. The measures are corrected for “spurious” entrants. All plotted 
values are 4-quarter moving averages. 
Pugsley & Şahin (2019) show that the declining start-up employment caused an increase 
in the share of mature firms in the US over the last three decades. Figure 3 shows that the age 
distribution of firms in Belgium shifted towards older firms.7 Over the 2008Q1 – 2017Q1 period 
the employment share of mature (ages 6+) firms increased from 92 percent to 94.5 percent. The 
firm share of mature firms increased from 66 to 74 percent. Therefore, we note that while the 
start-up employment was declining in Belgium, the share of mature firms was increasing.  
 
Figure 3. The figure plots the evolution of the employment share (the solid line) and the firm share (the dashed line) of 
mature (ages 6+) firms over time in Belgium based on NSSO data. The measures are corrected for “spurious” entrants. 
                                                          
7 Since we have to track each firm for at least five years to infer its age, we are able to distinguish between 
young (ages 1 to 5) and mature (ages 6+) firms starting from 2008Q1 and onwards. 
3.2.  Measuring the sectoral composition of start-ups 
To measure the sectoral composition of start-ups 𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 we divide sectors’ start-up 
employment by the overall start-up employment. Figure 4 plots the evolution of the sectoral 
composition of start-ups over time. The left panel indicates that the relative allocation of start-
up employment across sectors was stable over time. On average, most of the start-up 
employment is allocated to the distribution sector. The least of the start-up employment is 
allocated to the manufacturing sector. The right panel shows that the sectoral composition of 
start-ups in absolute terms was declining across all sectors. This is explained by the declining 
start-up employment overall.  
 
Figure 4. The figure plots the evolution of the sectoral composition of start-ups in relative (the left panel) and absolute (the 
right pane) terms over time in Belgium based on NSSO data. The solid, dashed and dash-dot lines correspond to the 
manufacturing, services and distribution sectors, respectively. The measures are corrected for “spurious” entrants. All values 
are plotted as a 4-quarter moving averages.   
For comparison purposes, we also plot the evolution of aggregate employment by sector 
over time in Figure 5. On average, the distribution sector has the most of employment, and it is 
slowly increasing over time, in absolute and relative terms.8 The services sector exhibit the 
greatest growth rate of employment over the period.9 The employment in manufacturing was 
declining in absolute and relative terms. Therefore, we note that while the sectoral allocation of  
                                                          
8 While there are some discontinuities in the aggregate employment during the 2007Q4-2008Q1 transition, 
they do not affect the trends significantly. 
9 In Appendix, subsection A1, we further decompose services by knowledge intensity to understand the rise of 
services and its heterogeneity. 
start-up employment was stable over the period, the sectoral composition of the economy was 
undergoing structural transformation.  
 
Figure 5. The figure shows the evolution of aggregate employment by sector for Belgium based on the NSSO data set. The 
left panel plots the evolution of employment share by sector. The right panel plots the evolution of aggregate employment 
by sector. The solid, dashed and dash-dot lines correspond to the manufacturing, services and distribution sectors, 
respectively. All values are plotted as a 4-quarter moving averages. 
 
3.3.  Measuring the sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates 
To measure the sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates we discretize 
firm age (𝑎 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6+) and compute the average over time of the survival rate and the 




).10  The measures are reported in 
Table 2.  
 Survival rate ?̅?𝑎
𝑗
 Conditional growth rate (1 + ?̅?𝑎
𝑗 ) 
Age Manufacturing Services Distribution Manufacturing Services Distribution 
1 0.954 0.946 0.922 1.315 1.378 1.362 
2 0.959 0.956 0.942 1.061 1.092 1.057 
3 0.968 0.964 0.954 1.024 1.060 1.042 
4 0.972 0.970 0.961 1.022 1.046 1.032 
5 0.977 0.973 0.968 1.020 1.027 1.028 
6+ 0.985 0.981 0.980 1.010 1.017 1.016 
Table 2. The table reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates based on the 
2011Q1 – 2017Q1 period in NSSO data.   
The survival rate increases with age across all sectors. The conditional growth rate decreases 
with age and it also holds across sectors. Between sectors, the distribution sector has the lowest 
survival rate and the manufacturing sector has the highest survival rate across all age groups. 
                                                          
10 We use the period after 2010 to compute the sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates 
because the period before that corresponds to the financial crisis with significant fluctuations. 
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector has the lowest conditional growth rate and the 
services sector has the highest conditional growth rate across all age groups.  While the 
differences between the sector’s age-specific survival and growth rates are small, they play a 
crucial role in explaining the aggregate employment dynamics of Belgium, as it will be shown 
later in the article.  
  
4. Results 
In this section we illustrate the role of start-ups in the aggregate employment dynamics 
of Belgium. In particular, we conduct a series of counterfactual simulations to isolate the 
channels along which start-ups affect aggregate employment. First, we investigate the role of 
fluctuations in the sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates in explaining the 
evolution of aggregate employment over time. As a result, we show that holding the sector’s 
age-specific survival rate and conditional growth rate at their averages, predicts well the trend 
evolution of aggregate employment in Belgium. Second, we quantify the effect of the declining 
start-up employment on the aggregate employment. We find that the declining startup 
employment slowed down the growth rate of aggregate employment by 26 percent over the 
2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period. We observe that the effect slowly builds up over time through having 
lower number of jobs among young (less than 6 years old) firms. Third, using the same period, 
we show that the sectoral composition of start-ups did not significantly affect the aggregate 
employment, but it affected the sectoral composition of economy by decreasing the 
employment in manufacturing by 7 percent and increasing the employment in distribution by 4 
percent. 
 
4.1. The stability of sector’s age-specific survival and growth rates 
To illustrate the stability of sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates, 
we perform a counterfactual simulation where we predict the aggregate employment using 
?̂?𝑡 = ∑ (𝑠𝑡
𝑗


















and holding the sector’s age specific survival rate and conditional growth rate at their sample 
averages (Table 2). The time variation in predicted aggregate employment comes from the 
variation in the start-up employment and the sectoral composition of start-ups, which are taken 
as given in the data.  
In Figure 6 we plot the actual and predicted employment. We start the prediction from 
2009Q2 because the aggregate employment during 2008Q1 – 2009Q1 was too volatile to start 
from. The solid lines plot the actual employment. The dashed lines plot the predicted 
employment. Given that the sample averages do not reflect the business-cycle fluctuations in 
the sector’s age specific survival rate and conditional growth rate, the model over-predicts the 
employment during economic downturns and under-predicts the employment during the 
economic booms. Nonetheless, the baseline predictions capture well the trend evolution of 
aggregate employment overall and by sector.  
 
Figure 6. The figure compares the actual and predicted employment by sector and in aggregate. The prediction is based on 
holding the sector’s age-specific survival rate and conditional growth rate at their sample averages. The solid line is the 
actual employment, and the dashed line is the prediction. The actual values are plotted as 4-quarter moving averages. 
This suggests that in Belgium the sector’s age-specific survival rate and conditional 
growth rate fluctuate around their mean values over time, and that these mean values are stable 
over time. To test the last point, we evaluate the trend component of 𝑥𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 and (1 + 𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
) over 
time. For the hypothesis to hold, the trend component should be statistically insignificant across 
sectors and age groups.  The results of OLS regressions are given in Table 3.  
The first and third regressions consider the entire sample of the data from 2008Q1 to 
2017Q1 for 𝑥𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 and (1 + 𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
), respectively.  Both regressions imply that the trend component 
is significant. The period of 2008-2010 was highly volatile in Belgium because of the financial 
crisis, which most likely caused too much volatility in the measure of 𝑥𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 and (1 + 𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
). 
Therefore, in the second and forth regressions we exclude the 2008-2010 period. Now the trend 
component of (1 + 𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
) is insignificant across all age groups and sectors. The trend component 
of 𝑥𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
 is insignificant in manufacturing and services across all age groups, but it is significant 
in the distribution sector for firms above the age of 2 years. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
negative, which suggests that the survival rate of incumbent firms in distribution is declining 
over time. Such a decline is most probably driven by exogenous factors (such as the adoption 
of information technologies or international trade) and not by the declining number of start-ups 
in that sector. If anything, the declining firm entry should lead to higher survival rate among 





) are not significant, and hence, the mean values of the survival and conditional 
growth rates are stable over time. 
Similarly, Pugsley & Şahin (2019)  show that the life-cycle dynamics of firms in the US 
remained relatively constant during the last three decades. They found that firm survival and 
employment growth rates conditional on age fluctuate around their mean values on aggregate, 
across sectors and states. Also for the US, Dent et al. (2016) show that the differences in the 
mean life-cycle dynamics of firms across sectors remained stable over time.  
The results illustrate that in Belgium the sector’s age-specific survival rate and 
conditional growth rate fluctuate around stable values over time. Therefore, we use the 
predicted aggregate employment based on holding the sector’s age-specific survival rate and 
conditional growth rate at their sample as the “actual” case for counterfactual analysis in the 
following sections.  
  
 Survival rate 𝑥𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
  Conditional Growth Rate (1 + 𝑛𝑡,𝑎
𝑗
) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Trend -0.0007* -0.0007  -0.0058* 0.0037 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Trend  -0.0008 -0.0016  0.0111*** 0.0045 
* age 1 – 2 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend  5.7e-05 -0.0003  0.0087** 0.0034 
* age 2 – 3 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend  0.0003 0.0009  0.0076* -0.0041 
* age 3 – 4 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend  0.0008 0.0016  0.0059 -0.0038 
* age 4 – 5 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend   0.0005 0.0006  0.0073* 0.0037 
* age 5 years and more (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend * Services  -0.0007 -0.0011  0.0045 0.0063 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend * Services  0.0004 0.0013  -0.0092 -0.0119 
* age 1 – 2 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Services  -1.8e-05 0.0006  -0.0068 -0.0148 
* age 2 – 3 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Services  -0.0003 -0.0014  -0.0034 -0.0018 
* age 3 – 4 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Services  -0.0005 -0.0015  -0.0034 -0.0034 
* age 4 – 5 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Services  0.0003 0.0004  -0.0041 -0.0046 
* age 5 years and more (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Distribution -0.002*** -0.0034***  0.0128*** 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Trend * Distribution   0.0014* 0.0031**  -0.0155*** -0.0087 
* age 1 – 2 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Distribution   0.0006 0.0017  -0.0128** -0.008 
* age 2 – 3 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Distribution 0.0008 0.0008  -0.0115* 0.0004 
* age 3 – 4 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Distribution 0.0005 -0.0001  -0.0105* -0.0016 
* age 4 – 5 years (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Trend * Distribution 0.0015* 0.0024  -0.0133** -0.0032 
* age 5 years and more (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Period 2008 – 2017  2011 – 2017   2008 – 2017 2011 – 2017  
N 648 450  648 450 
R2 0.863 0.859  0.887 0.895 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3. OLS regressions estimate the linear trend in survival rates and conditional employment growth rates by age and 
sector. Survival rate is fraction of sector-age cohort that survived from previous quarter. Conditional employment growth 
rate is the growth rate of cohort’s average employment size. All specifications control for quarter, sector and age fixed 
effects. Only coefficients of interest are included in the table. 
 
 
4.2. The impact of the declining start-up employment 
To illustrate the impact of the declining start-up employment on the aggregate 
employment, we run the following counterfactual simulation. We modify the baseline model 
(4) by replacing the actual start-up employment 𝑆𝑡 with a counterfactual start-up employment 
𝑆𝑡
𝑐𝑓
, which starts as the average of the actual start-up employment in 2009Q2 – 2010Q1 but 
continues to grow over time at an annual rate of 2 percent (0.4963 percent per quarter). The 
growth rate of 2 percent is chosen in order to mimic and maintain the start-up employment that 
we observe in the pre-crisis period. 
The first panel of Figure 7 plots the actual start-up employment (the solid line) and the 
counterfactual start-up employment (the dashed line) over time. While the actual start-up 
employment continues to decline in 2012 and picks up in 2014, the counterfactual start-up 
employment continues to grow steadily at a constant pace of 2 percent per year. The difference 
between two lines is the direct effect of the declining start-up employment on the aggregate 
employment, which is about 500 jobs per quarter or 2,000 jobs per year. The direct impact 
already becomes significant for a small economy such as Belgium. The accumulated number 
of lost jobs over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period sums up to 8,800 jobs, and it does not take into 
account the jobs due to the post-entry growth dynamics of potentially lost entrants.   
To estimate the overall effect of the declining start-up employment on the aggregate 
employment we predict the new evolution of aggregate employment ?̃?𝑡 using 






















and compare it to the actual (or the baseline) evolution of aggregate employment ?̂?𝑡 predicted 
using (4). The difference between the actual and predicted aggregate employment accounts for 
the declining start-up employment in the past, taking into account the cumulative indirect 
effects.  
The second panel of Figure 7 plots the actual aggregate employment (the solid line) and 
the predicted aggregate employment (the dashed line) based on the counterfactual start-up 
employment. The difference between the two lines grows over time and reaches almost 19 
thousand jobs in 2017Q1. Therefore, on average every additional start-up creates 2.2 jobs net 
in the next 8 years of their life-cycle.11 In terms of employment, the declining start-up 
employment decreased the aggregate employment by 1.1 percent relative to the predicted 
aggregate employment in 2017Q1. In terms of growth, the growth rate of aggregate 
employment slowed down by 26 percent over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period.  
 
Figure 7. The figure compares the actual employment with the predicted employment based on the counterfactual start-up 
employment. The left panel plots the start-up employment. The actual start-up employment is plotted as a 4-quarter moving 
average with the solid line. The counterfactual start-employment is plotted with the dashed line and starts as the actual 
start-up employment in 2009Q2 but continues to grow at an annual rate of 2 percent. The right panel plots the aggregate 
employment. The solid line is the actual aggregate employment based on holding the sector’s age-specific survival rate and 
conditional growth rate at their sample averages and using the actual start-up employment. The dashed line is the 
counterfactual aggregate employment based on the counterfactual start-up employment.  
Within young firms (ages < 6), the gap between the actual and predicted aggregate 
employment reaches 18,300 jobs in 2017Q1, which is about 96 percent of the total number of 
lost jobs due to the declining start-up employment. This illustrates how the declining start-up 
employment shifts the employment towards older firms. Interestingly, the emerged 
employment gap will persist over time even if the actual start-up employment also continues to 
grow at 2 percent per year after 2017. In the literature this effect is known as a “lost generation 
                                                          
11 This is a rough estimate obtained by dividing the total number of lost jobs due to the declining start-up 
employment (19,000 jobs) by the total number of lost start-ups (8,800 start-ups). Since the average size of a 
start-up upon entry is 1, therefore 8,800 start-ups is equivalent to 8,800 jobs.  
of firms”, which has a limited short run impact but persistent long run effect on employment 
(Sedláček, 2019). 
Table 4 shows the percent change of aggregate employment over the period from 
2009Q2 to 2017Q1 for the actual and counterfactual cases. In both cases, the employment 
decreases in manufacturing and increases in services. The magnitude of changes is slightly 
different, the decline in manufacturing happens faster in the actual case and the increase in 
services is more rapid in the counterfactual case. The distribution sector is different. While the 
aggregate employment of distribution sector went down by half a percentage point in the actual 
case, it went up by almost a percentage point in the counterfactual case. This is explained by 
the low survival rate of incumbent firms in the distribution sector. Nonetheless, the sectoral 
composition of economy stays relatively unchanged.  
 The percent change of aggregate employment 
Actual Counterfactual 
Manufacturing -6.75% -6.39% 
Services 15.22% 16.54% 
Distribution -0.56% 0.88% 
Total 3.11% 4.23% 
Table 4. The table shows the percent change of aggregate employment by sector and overall over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 
period for the actual case and the counterfactual case, where the start-up employment grows at the annual rate of 2%.   
In Appendix (subsection A4), we show a sensitivity analysis exploring various 
counterfactual scenarios for the start-up employment. The result remains robust, the declining 
start-up employment has a significant and persistent effect on the aggregate employment.  
 
4.3.  The impact of the sectoral composition of start-ups 
To illustrate how does the sectoral composition of start-ups affects aggregate 
employment, we simulate another counterfactual scenario where the sectoral allocation of start-
up employment is held fixed and proportional to the distribution of total employment across 
sectors. This approach is based on the idea of misallocation and a subsequent change in 
aggregate employment through the sectoral differences in sector’s age-specific survival and 
conditional growth rates. If the actual allocation of start-up employment across sectors is 
efficient, then any other allocation is inefficient. The difference in the evolution of aggregate 
employment between the two simulations is the gain due to efficient allocation of start-up 
employment across sectors. 
We modify the baseline model (4) by replacing the actual sectoral allocation of start-up 
employment 𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 with a counterfactual start-up employment 𝑠𝑐𝑓
𝑗
, which we set to the average 
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and compare it to the actual (or the baseline) evolution of aggregate employment ?̂?𝑡 predicted 
using (4).   
Figure 8 plots the evolution of actual and counterfactual scenarios. The solid lines in the 
upper three panels display the actual sectoral allocation of start-up employment. The dashed 
lines plot the counterfactual sectoral allocation of start-up employment. While the actual shares 
do fluctuate over time, their trend evolution was flat over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period. The 
counterfactual share of start-up employment is higher in manufacturing and lower in 
distribution than the actual share of start-up employment. Comparing the actual and 
counterfactual cases is similar to evaluating the sectoral job reallocation through entry margin.  
To see the impact on aggregate employment, we plot the evolution of aggregate 
employment by sector in the lower three panels of Figure 8. The solid and dashed lines 
correspond to the actual and predicted values, respectively. While the actual employment in 
manufacturing was decreasing, the predicted employment in manufacturing was flat over the 
2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period. On the other hand, the actual employment in distribution was 
relatively flat, while the predicted employment in distribution was decreasing. In services, both, 
the actual and predicted evolution of aggregate employment were increasing with the predicted 
employment slightly lagging behind. Similarly, the evolution of the overall employment did not 
change significantly. This suggests that the start-up jobs lost in manufacturing are compensated 
by the new jobs in distribution. 
 
Figure 8. The figure displays the results of the counterfactual exercise where we hypothetically keep the sectoral 
composition of start-ups fixed and proportional to the sectoral composition of economy in 2009. The upper three panels plot 
the actual (the solid lines) and counterfactual (the dashed lines) sectoral allocation of start-up employment by sector. The 
lower three panels plot the evolution of actual (the solid lines) and predicted (the dashed lines) employment by sector. The 
actual sectoral allocation of start-up employment is plotted as a 4-quarter moving average.  
To quantify the results of the simulation, we display the percent change of aggregate 
employment for the actual and counterfactual scenarios in Table 5. The first column shows the 
percent change of actual aggregate employment over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period.  The second 
column shows the percent change of predicted aggregate employment over the same period. 
The actual employment in manufacturing goes down by 6.7 percentage points more than the 
counterfactual one. On the other hand the actual employment in distribution goes down by 3.6 
percentage points less than the counterfactual one. In services, both, the actual and 
counterfactual employment increase by the same order of magnitude.  
 The percent change of aggregate employment 
Actual Counterfactual 
Manufacturing -6.75% -0.04% 
Services 15.22% 14.43% 
Distribution -0.56% -4.18% 
Total 3.11% 3.13% 
Table 5. The table shows the percent change of aggregate employment by sector and overall over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 
period for the actual case and the counterfactual case, where the sectoral composition of start-ups is fixed and proportional 
to the sectoral composition of economy.      
The results of the simulation suggest that the sectoral composition of start-ups did not 
affect the overall employment significantly, but significantly changed the sectoral composition 
of economy by decreasing the employment share of manufacturing and preventing the 
distribution sector from a bigger decline.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the role of start-ups in the aggregate employment dynamics of 
Belgium. In particular, we analyze the two channels along which start-ups affect aggregate 
employment: the start-up employment and the sectoral composition of start-ups. To this end, 
we decompose the evolution of aggregate employment by sector and age, and run a series of 
counterfactual simulations.     
The first channel illustrates that the declining start-up employment slowed down the 
growth rate of aggregate employment by 26 percent over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period by 
shifting the age distribution of firms towards older and slower growing firms. Based on our data 
this represents 19 thousand lost jobs over 8 years and the majority of these jobs are among 
young firms. The emerged employment gap persistently grows over time. This suggests that the 
secular decline in firm entry observed in Belgium has a significant and growing effect of 
dampening the aggregate employment growth.     
The second channel shows that the sectoral composition of start-ups did not affect the 
overall employment growth of Belgium. However within sectors, the sectoral composition of 
start-ups plays a crucial role for maintaining the size of the distribution sector by reallocating 
the employment from manufacturing to distribution and services. The rise of employment in 
services is mainly driven by the growth dynamics of incumbent firms. 
We confirm the importance of supporting firm entry as it has positive and significant 
effect on aggregate employment growth. On average every additional start-up in Belgium 
creates 2.2 jobs net in the following 8 years of its life-cycle. Therefore, government regulations 
need to focus on eliminating administrative entry barriers to the creation of new firms across 
all sectors. We highlight the heterogeneity in post-entry growth dynamics of start-ups between 
different sectors and suggest that detailed sectoral analysis would offer additional insights for 
the direction of structural changes, which have implications to skills and infrastructure related 
policies.  
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Appendix 
A1. Understanding the rise of services and its heterogeneity 
 Differentiating the distribution sector from the services sector highlighted the 
differences in employment dynamics between the two sectors. Young firms in services have 
higher survival and conditional employment growth rates than young firms in distribution. 
Within services we can further differentiate between more and less knowledge intensive firms. 
We use average firm wages as a proxy for knowledge intensity. Using this proxy suggests that 
firms which pay higher average wages are more knowledge intensive.  
We split the services sector into two segments, high and low knowledge intensity 
segments. The NSSO data include total gross wage per firm per quarter. We compute average 
gross wages per FTE per quarter by dividing total gross wages by FTE number of employees. 
Table 6 reports summary statistics of the data on services by knowledge intensity.  
 Services – High Services – Low 
NACE 2-digit code (Rev. 2) 58 – 63, 64 – 66, 69 – 75 68, 77 – 82 
Number of firms 33,643 18,387 
Average firm size 9.9 FTE 14.5 FTE 
Wage / FTE / quarter 9,003.24 EUR 6,735.32 EUR 
Table 6. The table reports summary statistics of NSSO data on services by knowledge intensity for 2008Q1 – 2017Q1 period. 
High-knowledge intensive services include information and communication activities, 
financial and insurance activities, and professional and technical activities. Low-knowledge 
intensive sectors include administrative and support activities. While there are more high-
knowledge intensive firms, on average they are smaller in size than low-knowledge intensive 
firms. On the other hand, high-knowledge intensive firms pay 30 percent higher wages than 
their low-knowledge intensive counterparts. 
Figure 9 plots the evolution of sectoral composition of services by knowledge intensity. 
The manufacturing and distribution sectors are not shown for convenience. The solid line plots 
the evolution of employment share of high- and low- knowledge intensity services. While the 
employment share of high-knowledge intensity services remained stable around 20 percent, the 
employment share of low-knowledge intensity services has increased from 14 to 18 percent of 
the economy during the 2008 – 2017 period. The dashed line plots the share of start-up 
employment by knowledge intensity of services. There is more entry in high-knowledge 
services with 24 percent of start-up employment than in low-knowledge intensity services with 
12 percent of start-up employment.  
 
Figure 9. The figure plots the evolution of sectoral composition of services by knowledge intensity. The solid line plots the 
employment share of services by knowledge intensity. The dashed line plots the share of start-up employment by knowledge 
intensity. The manufacturing and distribution sectors are not shown in the figure.      
Table 7 reports the mean values of services’ age-specific survival and conditional 
growth rates by knowledge intensity. The survival rate of young high-knowledge intensity 
services is higher than the survival rate of young low-knowledge intensity services. The 
conditional growth rate of low-knowledge intensity services is higher than the conditional 
growth rate of high-knowledge intensity services regardless of age. The evidence suggests that 
the rise of services is driven by the high conditional growth rate of low-knowledge intensity 
firms and the high survival rate of young high-knowledge intensity firms.   
 Survival rate ?̅?𝑎
𝑗
 Conditional growth rate (1 + ?̅?𝑎
𝑗 ) 
Age Services – High Services – Low Services – High  Services – Low 
1 0.950 0.938 1.333 1.454 
2 0.959 0.949 1.073 1.119 
3 0.967 0.958 1.049 1.073 
4 0.973 0.964 1.039 1.055 
5 0.975 0.970 1.029 1.026 
6+ 0.981 0.981 1.015 1.021 
Table 7. The table reports the mean values of services’ age-specific survival and conditional growth rates by knowledge 
intensity segment based on the 2011Q1-2017Q1 period in NSSO data.  
A2. Robustness of the average survival and conditional growth rates 
To evaluate the time variation of the average survival and conditional growth rates, we 
measure the mean values of sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates on 
subsamples, 2011 – 2013 vs 2014 – 2016. This corresponds to twelve observations for each 
subsample. Table 8 reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific survival rates by subsample. 
The survival rate increases with age across all sectors and time periods. While there are some 
differences across time periods, there is not enough evidence to suggest that these differences 
are statistically different from zero. Based on point estimates, the survival rate before 2014 was 
slightly higher than after 2014. However these differences are not economically significant.    
𝑥𝑎
𝑗
 Manufacturing Services Distribution 
Age 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 
1 0.952 0.956 0.947 0.946 0.927 0.920 
2 0.963 0.957 0.958 0.954 0.945 0.941 
3 0.969 0.968 0.966 0.963 0.957 0.953 
4 0.970 0.973 0.973 0.967 0.964 0.960 
5 0.976 0.978 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.966 
6+ 0.985 0.985 0.983 0.980 0.981 0.979 
Table 8. The table reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific survival rates computed on subsamples, 2011 – 2013 vs 
2014 – 2016, based on the NSSO data.  
 Table 9 reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific conditional growth rates by 
subsample. The conditional growth rate decreases with age across all sectors and time periods. 
While there are some differences across time periods, there is not enough evidence to suggest 
that these differences are statistically different from zero. Based on point estimates, the 
conditional growth rate before 2014 was lower than after 2014. This could be due to business 
cycle fluctuations of the economy during the 2011 – 2014 period.12 This is in line with the 
observation of Pugsley & Şahin (2019). The authors show that the deviations of the mean 
survival and conditional growth rates from the means are correlated with the business cycle 
                                                          
12 According to the National Bank of Belgium the GDP growth of Belgium during the 2012 – 2013 period was 
near zero and even negative in the first quarter of 2013.    
fluctuations. These suggests that taking longer samples is necessary to capture “true” survival 
and conditional growth rates.    
?̅?𝑎
𝑗
 Manufacturing Services Distribution 
Age 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 2011 – 2013 2014 – 2016 
1 0.316 0.322 0.378 0.350 0.353 0.371 
2 0.045 0.075 0.089 0.094 0.052 0.062 
3 0.007 0.039 0.059 0.060 0.036 0.048 
4 0.025 0.021 0.032 0.060 0.025 0.041 
5 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.028 0.023 0.034 
6+ 0.009 0.010 0.014 0.022 0.014 0.018 
Table 9. The table reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific conditional growth rates computed on subsamples, 2011 
– 2013 vs 2014 – 2016, based on the NASSO data. 
 
A3. The survival and conditional growth rates, Young vs Mature vs Old 
To understand the heterogeneity in growth dynamics of mature firms (ages 6+), we 
further segment mature firms. Here we differentiate between young (ages 1 – 5), mature (ages 
6 – 10) and old firms (ages 11+). Since we don’t have the data on firm age explicitly, we infer 
firm age implicitly by tracking each for at least 10 years. This way we are able to distinguish 
between young, mature, and old firms starting from 2013Q1 and onwards. Table 10 reports the 
mean values of sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates. 
 Survival rate ?̅?𝑎
𝑗
 Conditional growth rate (1 + ?̅?𝑎
𝑗 ) 
Age Manufacturing Services Distribution Manufacturing Services Distribution 
1 – 5  0.967 0.962 0.949 1.078 1.087 1.092 
6 – 10  0.982 0.978 0.973 1.018 1.025 1.021 
11+ 0.986 0.982 0.981 1.010 1.020 1.015 
Table 10. The table reports the mean values of sector’s age-specific survival and conditional growth rates based on the 
2013Q1 – 2017Q1 period in the NSSO data.  
The survival rate of firms increases with age and this pattern holds across sectors on 
average. The difference in survival rates between young and mature firms is significantly higher 
than the difference in survival rates between mature and old firms. The conditional growth rate 
of firms decreases with firm age and this pattern holds across all sectors. Similarly, the 
difference between young and mature firms is significantly higher than the difference between 
mature and old firms. This suggests that the differences in growth dynamics of mature and old 
firms are not very significant compared to the differences in growth dynamics of young and 
mature firms.  
This empirical observation is in line with Geurts & Van Biesebroeck (2016), where the 
authors using the data on Belgian firms show that the post-entry growth dynamics of firms are 
increasing with firm size until the age of five. For firms older than five years, firm growth 
follows the Gibrat’s law where size and growth are independent (Lawless, 2014).  
 
A4. The impact of the declining start-up employment – sensitivity analysis 
While in the main analysis we compare the linearly increasing start-up employment at 
2 percent a year with the actual start-up employment, here we explore the importance of non-
declining start-up employment. To this end, we fit a straight line through the actual start-up 
employment to estimate the trend and compute the resulting aggregate employment based on 
the fitted start-up employment. After that we reverse the declining start-up employment trend 
and compute the new aggregate employment based on the reversed start-up employment. We 
explore two scenarios for reversing the trend, constant and increasing start-up employment.  
 
Figure 10. The figure plots the evolution of aggregate employment based on the different evolutions of start-up employment. 
The left panel plots the start-up employment. The dots plot the actual start-up employment observed in the NSSO data. The 
solid line plots a fitted line over time. Starting from 2009Q2, the dashed and dash-dot lines plot the stable and increasing start-
up employment scenarios, respectively. The right panel plots the simulated total employment as a function of start-up 
employment scenarios.       
 The left panel of Figure 10 plots the actual start-up employment (the dots) measured in 
the NSSO data and the counterfactual scenarios for the start-up employment. The straight solid 
line plots the fitted line based on the point estimates of actual start-up employment over time. 
The line is downward sloping confirming the secular decline of start-up employment in 
Belgium. Starting from 2009Q2, we consider two counterfactual scenarios, stable start-up 
employment (the dashed line) and increasing start-up employment (the dash-dot line). Both of 
the counterfactual scenarios for start-up employment initiate of the fitted value of start-up 
employment in 2009Q2. 
The right panel of Figure 10 plots the simulated aggregate employment using  
























 is the start-up employment corresponding to each of the scenarios aforementioned. 
The dots plot the evolution of simulated aggregate employment based on the actual start-up 
employment. The solid line plots the evolution of simulated aggregate employment based on 
the fitted start-up employment. The dashed line plots the evolution of simulated aggregate 
employment based on the counterfactual stable start-up employment. The dash-dot line plots 
the evolution of simulated aggregate employment based on the counterfactual increasing start-
up employment.  
Table 11 reports the percent change of aggregate employment over the 2009Q2 – 
2017Q1 period for different scenarios of start-up employment. For the stable start-up 
employment case, the aggregate employment is predicted to grow by 1 percentage point more 
when comparing to the linearly declining start-up employment case. The difference between 
the actual and fitted cases, suggests that even short-term declines in the start-up employment 
have persistent effect on the aggregate employment.    
The percent change of aggregate employment 
Actual Fitted Stable Increasing 
3.11% 3.45% 4.48% 5.50% 
Table 11. The table reports the percent change of aggregate employment over the 2009Q2 – 2017Q1 period for different 
scenarios of start-up employment.  
